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CASES NOTED
THE RIGHT TO REPLY: A CHALLENGE TO
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Tornillo was a candidate for the Florida state legislature. After the
Miami Herald' printed two editorials attacking his personal character,
Tornillo demanded verbatim publication of his replies pursuant to sec-
tion 104.38 of the Florida Statutes.' Upon refusal, Tornillo filed a com-
plaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Because of the imminence
of the election, the Dade County Circuit Court granted an emergency
hearing and held that section 104.38 violated the constitution of Florida8
and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution on the
grounds that the statute restrains freedom of speech and press and that
it is impermissibly vague and indefinite. On direct appeal,' the Supreme
Court of Florida held, reversed and remanded: Section 104.38 of the
Florida Statutes does not abridge the freedom of speech and press, and
it lies within the limits prescribed by the constitutions of Florida and the
United States.' Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78
(Fla. 1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973).
1. The Miami Herald is Florida's largest newspaper with a circulation of over 400,000.
It is owned by Knight News, Inc., a Florida corporation commanding one of the largest
newspaper chains in the country. See 15 FLA. TREND MAGAznE 34 (March 1973).
2. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as section 104.38].
Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; SPACE FOR REPLY.-If any news-
paper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination
or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or mis-
feasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free
space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate imme-
diately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a
place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided
such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any person or
firm failing to comply with the provision of this section shall be guilty of mis-
demeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
3. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972). The applicable
constitutional provisions are:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS.-Every person may speak, write and pub-
lish his sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that
right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may
be given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was pub-
lished with good motives, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
DUE PROCESS.-No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be com-
pelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
4. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
5. For its holding, the Supreme Court of Florida drew its authority from the following
sections of the state and federal constitutions:
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld section 104.38 by favorably ap-
plying the principles and language contained in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court which deal with press freedom under the
first amendment. It is the Supreme Court's position, then, which must
be examined in analyzing Tornillo. The United States Supreme Court
has traditionally refused to sanction state regulation of the first amend-
ment freedom to express political views.6 An independent press has been
held indispensable to a well informed public in a system committed to
peaceful social change.7 With this in mind, the press was initially granted
constitutional immunity from censorship despite a recognition that the
privilege could be abused. Abuses were to be tolerated as unavoidable
in order to achieve the higher goal of an unfettered "marketplace of
ideas." 8 To insure the viability of that concept, the courts insulated the
broad, yet vulnerable, immunity of the press from the power of govern-
ment by requiring that legislatures may "regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity."9 To enforce this requirement the courts have viewed
all statutes affecting the first amendment freedoms with a presumption
of unconstitutionality, placing the burden on the government to prove
otherwise.10
Only in specific areas is a newspaper's freedom to publish subject
to government control. Commercial speech, for instance, does not enjoy
the same protection under the first amendment as does socially or politi-
cally oriented commentary." The press may also be regulated by laws
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
REGULATION OF ELECTIONS.-All elections by the people shall be by direct
and secret vote. General elections shall be determined by a plurality of votes cast.
Registration and elections shall, and political party functions may, be regulated by
law.
Also see text of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4, at note 3 supra.
6. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1966); Schneider v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S.
147 (1939).
7. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The first amendment was
promulgated to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
8. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2111-13
(1973); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 389 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
9. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); accord, New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (5-4 decision in which the government unsuccessfully sought to
enjoin two newspapers from publishing contents of classified studies on Viet Nam policy);
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
10. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam),
quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 50, 70 (1950); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1935) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
11. Pittsburg Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553 (1973) (up-
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which affect its function as a business enterprise for profit.'2 In the area
of political commentary, however, newspapers are vulnerable to censor-
ship only if a clear and present danger to a compelling state interest
makes regulation absolutely necessary.'"
Outside these limited areas, contemporary Supreme Court decisions
have enlarged the scope of press immunity to further insure "uninhibited,
robust and wide-open" debate on public issues in spite of "vehement"
and "caustic" attacks on public officials.' 4 Thus, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 5 precluded actions of libel against newspapers absent a show-
ing that the defamatory falsehood was printed "with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false."'16 Corol-
lary decisions have since applied the Sullivan test to all public figures' 7
and to individuals affected by issues of public or general concern.18 With-
out such protection, the Supreme Court believed that newspapers would
drift toward self-censorship to the ultimate detriment of the public. 9
In comparison, broadcasters in radio and television must adhere to
the Federal Communications Commission's fairness doctrine, which im-
poses on them a duty to present the viewing and listening public with
fair and impartial coverage of public issues. Furthermore, the fairness
holding a city ordinance which forbade publishing employment advertisements under head-
ings designating preference by sex) ; Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also
Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) (holding that
in absence of statutory regulation, a newspaper may publish or reject commercial advertising).
But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that if the
advertisement itself deals with matters of the highest public interest and concern, it is pro-
tected by the first amendment).
12. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (upholding application
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to newspapers); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945) (upholding application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to press enterprises);
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (upholding application of the National Labor
Relations Act to the press); Chronicle & Gazette Publishing Co. v. Attorney General, 94
N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478 (1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690 (1947).
However, the Court has on several occasions invalidated laws which infringe on the
special needs of a vigorous and independent press. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(law prohibiting door to door distribution of leaflets); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938) (law requiring license for the distribution of printed matter); Grosjean v. Amer-
ican Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (law taxing revenue of newspapers with circulation over
20,000).
13. Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (restricting publications creating breach of
the peace); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (banning publications concerning
"deeds of bloodshed and lust") ; Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (forbidding publications
advocating polygamy); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (forbidding socialist pub-
lications advocating overthrow of government) ; United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th
Cir. 1972) (banning advertisements for apartments indicating racial preference).
14. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
15. Id. [hereinafter referred to as Sullivan].
16. Id. at 254.
17. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
18. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967).
19. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969) ; NAACP .v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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doctrine specifically provides for an "equal time" access to the media if
a broadcaster editorially attacks the personal character of a candidate
for public office or if the broadcaster airs the political advertisements of
his opponents.2 0 Broadcasters are regulated by the government because
of inherent technological limitations not found in the printed media. Be-
cause the airwaves constitute a finite and "scant resource" which is not
available to all, broadcasters necessarily occupy the role of public
trustees. These limitations, however, have been held inapplicable to
newspapers. 2 '
The growth of publishing empires and the increasing concentration
of the mass media into fewer hands2 2 has engendered claims that news-
papers no longer reflect the "marketplace of ideas" concept envisioned
by past Supreme Court decisions. Instead, the daily newspapers are
charged with having become the conduits for the opinions of a homo-
geneous publishing elite .2  As alternative channels for expression dry up,
politicians find it increasingly difficult to defend themselves from attack.
Therefore, it is argued, the principles of the fairness doctrine should be
extended to newspapers in order to protect the politician from the ad-
verse effects of monopolization. Extension of the fairness doctrine to
newspapers, however, may not be necessary. Congress has attempted to
decelerate the growing problem of press "monopolization" by support-
ing lower postal rates24 to defray the operating costs of the smaller pub-
lications, and by granting to large newspapers limited anti-trust immu-
nity to preserve the reportorial and editorial independence of financially
distressed publications.28
20. The right of access does not extend to statements arising from bona fide news cover-
age by the broadcaster. In such cases the broadcaster's duty is to follow the guidelines of im-
partiality, and he risks the revocation of his license if he breaches that duty. There is no
initial right to access for the purposes of political advertisement, however. Communications
Act of 1934, tit. III, § 301, 48 Stat. 1801, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq., § 315(a)
(1971) ; 47 C.F.R. H§ 73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1972). For a summary of the development of
the fairness doctrine, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-86 (1969).
21. "Unlike broadcasting, the publication of a newspaper is not a government conferred
privilege.... [Tihe press and government have had a history of disassociation." Associates
& Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1971); accord, Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973); Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
22. The nineteen largest publishing chains own more than three hundred and thirty
dailies. The chains now contol one half of the dailies, three quarters of the television sta-
tions and one third of the radio stations. Rucker, Let's Protect Our Dying First Freedom, in
RRAImNOS IN MASS COiMeMIlCATIOI 364 (1970). For further statistics on the historical de-
velopment of media concentration, see Hearings on S. 1312 Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
23. See generally Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1641 (1967); Bennet, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section
Seven Lens, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 159 (1971); Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative
to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948) ; Note, Vindication of the Reputation of
a Public Official, 80 HAR. L. REV. 1730 (1967).
24. 39 C.F.R. § 132.1 (1972).
25. Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1971).
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The Massachusetts legislature recently submitted a proposed statu-
tory amendment for an advisory opinion by its supreme court. The
amendment provided a political candidate with a right of access to a
newspaper which printed any of his opponent's advertisements if they
were detrimental to his campaign.2" That court held the provision uncon-
stitutional on three grounds: (1) that the fairness doctrine applied only
to broadcasters; 27 (2) that the measure might "produce the chilling ef-
fect of discouraging newspapers ... from accepting any political adver-
tisements .. 21 thereby restricting the distribution of information to the
electorate; 2  and (3) that no state interest was served by imposing a
"right of access" despite the "monopolistic" status of newspapers.29
In opposition to that theory, the instant case presents a bold rein-
terpretation of press immunity under the first amendment. By holding
that the monopolistic press had jeopardized the unrestricted flow of in-
formation, and by maintaining that a well informed public is critical to
the election process, the Supreme Court of Florida legitimized section
104.38 as necessary to the furtherance and protection of a compelling
state interest. In reaching this conclusion, the court has, for the first
time, consciously extended the guidelines of the fairness doctrine to
newspapers, emphasizing that the statute does not exclude press com-
ment, but instead assures an atmosphere of free debate as intended by
the first amendment.
30
Both Sullivan and Tornillo declare themselves in favor of robust
and wide-open debate. But section 104.38, as upheld actually counter-
poises the effect of Sullivan, restricting the independence of the press3" by
providing candidates with "access" when their personal characters have
been assailed.32 Section 104.38 also castigates the press for printing
matters which, in fact, are not libelous, and any truthful and bona fide
criticism, if unfavorable, presumably gives candidates a "right of ac-
cess," or a cause of action if the newspaper declines to grant "equal
space."33 In that context, the statute virtually divorces the press from its
26. Opinion of the Justices, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973) (declaring proposed amend-
ment to statute which would impose the basic principles of the fairness doctrine as to political
advertising on newspapers).
27. Id. at 833.
28. Id. at 834.
29. [C]ompulsion to publish all responsive political advertisements . . . goes beyond
what is essential to the furtherance of any interest of a State in its citizens having
a right of access to newspapers in order to express . . . political ideas which other-
wise would not be published.
Id. at 835.
30. 287 So. 2d 78. In the case of State v. News Journal Corp., (County Judge's Ct. for
Volusia County, Florida, February 14, 1972), Judge Durden held section 104.38 unconstitu-
tional as impermissibly vague and not applicable to the principles of the fairness doctrine.
The Attorney General of Florida declined to support section 104.38 both at that trial and at
a hearing before Judge Christie of the Dade County Circuit Court concerning the instant
case. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972).
31. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text. See generally articles cited note 25, supra.
33. Fla. Stat. § 104.38 (1971) provides that charges of misfeasance in office and attacks
1973)
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constitutionally protected role as an independent critic of government. 4
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, emphasizes that "no specified
newspaper content is excluded"3 5 by section 104.38, implying that com-
manding a newspaper to publish against its will is not equivalent to gov-
ernment control of news content. This contention has been rejected by
past cases, holding that "[t]here is no difference between compelling
publication of material ... and prohibiting a newspaper from printing
news or other material."8 6
The Supreme Court of Florida predicts that vanishing competition
within the media will ultimately result "in a form of private censor-
ship."' 37 It prefers the alternative of public control over newspapers
under the principles of the fairness doctrine as enunciated in the Su-
preme Court decision of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.88 That de-
cision, however, was specifically limited to instances involving the pecu-
liarities of the broadcasting media. The court in Tornillo attempted to
hurdle this gap by taking judicial notice of the dependence of news-
papers on the telegraph wires and the airwaves in gathering its news be-
fore publication. 9 Curiously enough, Justice Roberts, specially concur-
ring in the court's per curiam decision, distinguishes Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee40 as inapplicable
to the facts in Tornillo because the former is limited to broadcasters. 1
The fact that Red Lion applies but Columbia Broadcasting does not, is
a contradiction that is left unexplained.
Tornillo also interprets section 104.38 as a legitimate vehicle for
the maintenance of "conditions conducive to free and fair elections.
'4 2
In Mills v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court summarily dis-
missed a similar argument by stating: "We should point out at once that
this question in no way involves the extent of a State's power to regulate
on a candidate's public record are punishable as misdemeanors in the first degree if the
newspaper refuses to grant equal space. See note 2 supra.
34. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
35. 287 So. 2d at 82.
36. Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1971).
Accord, e.g., Pittsburg Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 93 S. Ct. 2553 (1973);
Joint Board, Amal. Cloth. Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Avins v. Rutgers State Univ., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.
1967); Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
"[L]iberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go
into a newspaper." Z. CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1946).
37. 287 So. 2d at 83.
38. Red Lions Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC's regu-
lations within the scope of the fairness doctrine). See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
39. 287 So. 2d at 87.
40. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973)
(holding that the Democratic Party could not compel a television station to air its political
advertisements unless the opposition had been granted the privilege). See note 20 supra and
accompanying text.
41. 287 So. 2d at 87.
42. 287 So. 2d at 81.
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conduct in and around the polls .... ,,43 The "question" the Court was
referring to was whether a State could restrain newspapers from com-
menting on the candidates on election day. If the Court was unwilling to
accept this imposition on newspapers, it can hardly be expected to adopt
the rationale expounded in Tornillo which extends the State of Florida's
right to regulate newspapers to the entire election period.
The Supreme Court of Florida sought to combat the adverse effects
of an overly concentrated ownership of the media, a problem engen-
dered by the growth of newspapers as business enterprises. Unlike the
political independence of newspapers which is protected by the first
amendment, the business and economic aspects of a newspaper's opera-
tion are subject to anti-trust legislation.44 Congress has already shown
its ability to regulate a newspaper's finances through the Newspaper
Preservation Act.45 Thus, the better solution rests squarely on the legis-
latures to tackle the problem of concentration in the mass media at its
roots. The courts should not sacrifice the political potency of news-
papers by upholding a questionable statute, which seeks to solve an
economic problem with a political solution, at the expense of the first
amendment. Justice Douglas recently quoted Thomas I. Emerson, a
leading first amendment scholar, who said,
any effort to solve the broader problems of a monopoly press
by forcing newspapers to cover all 'newsworthy' events and
print viewpoints, under the watchful eyes of petty public of-
ficials, is likely to undermine such independence as the press
now shows without achieving any real diversity. 6
43. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). The Alabama statute which prohibited
newspapers from supporting candidates on election day was held unconstitutional as an
"obvious and flagrant abridgement of freedom of the press" because it muzzled a newspaper
when it can be most effective as an independent and outspoken critic of government. Id. at
219.
44. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
[The first amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemi-
nation of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a
command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does
not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom . . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed
by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment
does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.
Id. at 20.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1971) (granting large newspapers limited anti-trust immunity
to allow smaller newspapers to merge production facilities but not editorial or reportorial
staffs).
46. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2110
(1973). An alternative to the problem of press concentration in the form of "press councils"
has steadily been growing in popularity around the country and the idea has been adopted
in several states. The press council provides an independent forum in which complaints are
aired, mediated and then ruled upon. Prior to the hearing, the aggrieved party waives his
right to litigate the issue in the courts of law, and the newspaper, in turn, voluntarily agrees
to abide by the decision of the Council. The Councils are composed of newspapermen and
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Both the constitutional and policy reasons set forth above appear to
warrant reversal by the United States Supreme Court.
HENRY J. VAN WAGENINGEN
SIX-MEMBER CIVIL JURY ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL
After a federal district court judge scheduled this civil diversity
case to be tried before a six-member jury, as required by the local rules
of the United States District Court of Montana,' petitioner filed a writ
of mandamus to direct the judge to impanel a jury of twelve. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the writ.' On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed: The local
federal court rule providing for six-member juries in civil suits does not
violate either the seventh amendment3 or rule 48 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." Colgrove v. Battin, 93 S. Ct. 2448 (1973).
There has been much debate as to the interpretation of the words
of the seventh amendment providing that "[i]n suits at common law
... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .. .according to the
rules of the common law." One view would incorporate into the American
jury trial system all the common law rules regarding jury trials. The
Supreme Court in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof5 found that the jury trial
referred to in the Constitution is the same as it existed in England at the
time the Constitution was adopted. Thus, it has been held that a consti-
tutional jury requires twelve men, even though the number is not speci-
fied in the Constitution, and that with less than twelve there is no jury at
all.' Twelve-member juries have also been given great support in other
federal court decisions."
A second interpretation of the seventh amendment is that the jury
trial should be preserved in its most fundamental form without including
prominent lay figures in the community. See A. BALK, A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS (1973);
BACK TALK: PRESS COUNCILS IN AMERICA (W. Rivers ed. 1972).
1. "A jury for the trial of civil cases shall consist of six persons .... " U.S. DiST. CT.
FOR DIST. OF MONT. (Civ.) R. 13(d)(1).
2. Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1972).
3. "In suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. "The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than
twelve . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
5. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
6. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). This case discussed the "trial by
jury" clause of the sixth amendment.
7. E.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942).
